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Origins and Destinations – Social Security Claimant
Dynamics
M I C H A E L  N O B L E *  S I N  Y I  C H E U N G * *  G E O RG E  S M I T H †
A B S T R AC T
This article briefly reviews American and British literature on welfare
dynamics and examines the concepts of welfare dependency and ‘depen-
dency culture’ with particular reference to lone parents. Using UK benefit
data sets, the welfare dynamics of lone mothers are examined to explore
the extent to which they inform the debates. Evidence from Housing
Benefits data show that even over a relatively short time period, there is
significant turnover in the benefits-dependent lone parent population
with movement in and out of income support as well as movement into
other family structures. Younger lone parents and owner-occupiers tend
to leave the data set while older lone parents and council tenants are
most likely to stay. Some owner-occupier lone parents may be relatively
well off and on income support for a relatively short time between separa-
tion and a financial settlement being reached. They may also represent a
more highly educated and highly skilled group with easier access to the
labour market than renters. Any policy moves paralleling those in the
United States to time limit benefit will disproportionately affect older lone
parents.
As Walker and Ashworth (1994) forcefully argue, the ‘time dimension’ has
often been neglected in the analysis of poverty. Cross-sectional data (even
repeated cross-sectional studies) may easily give the impression of a static
position, where those in poverty at any one time remain in that position
long-term. This, in turn, may help to feed the belief in the inevitability of
long-term ‘welfare dependency’. With the increasing availability of
income panel data, longitudinal cohort studies and the growing use of
administrative data during the 1980s, a research response (mainly in the
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United States) has been to focus on the question of ‘welfare dynamics’,
that is the extent to which those on ‘welfare’ (here used in its American
sense as a synonym for the social assistance benefit AFDC – Aid for
Families with Dependent Children) stay put or move on over time (Bane
and Ellwood, 1983, 1994; Ellwood, 1988; Pavetti, 1993).
Two sets of questions underpin this debate: first the apparently
straightforward descriptive account of length of time on, and movement
into and out of welfare; and second, the main reasons for any such move-
ments. The critical policy backdrop to this debate in the United States has
been changing social norms, with the growing expectation that lone par-
ents should do paid work and that the role of welfare should no longer be
(if it ever was) simply to offer income maintenance but to actively encour-
age a return to paid work (Waldfogel, 1996; Bane, 1997). This ‘encour-
agement’ has taken an increasingly aggressive stance, seen for example
in the imposition of fixed time limits to welfare receipt, first on a state by
state basis between 1992 and 1996 and later nationally through the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 1996. The
latter reinforces the now time limited nature of ‘welfare’ by replacing
AFDC with TANF – ‘Temporary Aid for Needy Families’ – from July 1997. 
U S W E L FA R E D Y N A M I C S
There is no question that the US ‘welfare dynamics’ research and debate
has significantly influenced, or at least interacted with, policy develop-
ments in the US. While the move to temporary or fixed term ‘safety net’
benefits does not necessarily follow from the research findings on welfare
dynamics, there is no doubt that they have been used to argue that those
who stay on welfare beyond a certain point in time (for example, two or
five years) are likely to become long-term dependants, where welfare
becomes ‘a way of life’. Welfare in the US has indeed been changed funda-
mentally, and research has in part helped to ease open this Pandora’s box,
even if the research argument for time limited protection formed only
part of a package of much wider reforms (Bane and Ellwood, 1994). 
The debate on welfare and ‘welfare dependency’ in Britain has been
heavily influenced by American debate and terminology, as if both the bene-
fit structures and the underlying social and economic conditions were effec-
tively the same. Rather obviously they are not, though there are enough
similarities to make it possible to slide from one set of policy arrangements
to the other, without always seeing the join. But we need to be very sure of
the findings and more importantly the implications drawn from ‘welfare
dynamics’ research, as emphasis on ‘welfare-to-work’ and the possible time
limiting of benefit moves rapidly up the policy agenda in Britain.
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What do the US studies show? Bane and Ellwood (1994) used data from
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a sample of 5,000 families
followed from 1968 to 1988. The very long-time frame of this study
reduces the problems of measuring incomplete spells (either at start – ‘left
censored’, or at conclusion – ‘right censored’), a problem for shorter-range
studies. On the other hand, the study uses annual sampling points and
this has the effect of ‘smoothing out’ the dynamics – underestimating the
level of exits from and entries to ‘welfare’ (i.e., AFDC). 
Their findings are at first sight paradoxical – while more than half of all
spells on welfare last less than 2 years and only 14 per cent last 10 years
or more, 48 per cent of welfare recipients at any particular point in time
will be on for 10 years or more (Bane and Ellwood, 1994). The analogy is
with short and long-stay patients in a hospital, where the former may be
much more numerous over time but at any one point in time occupy a
small number of beds, while the latter occupy more beds but with little
turnover. 
Pavetti (1993) in her work on welfare dynamics made use of the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979–89 (NLSY). This contains
monthly rather than annual sampling points. The analysis suggests that
the effect of using monthly data is to increase substantially the ‘exit prob-
abilities’ in the first years. Conversely the returns to welfare are signifi-
cantly higher. Similarly, as would be expected, total time on welfare is
slightly less for the monthly NSLY data. While 70 per cent of those begin-
ning a spell of welfare will be on welfare for a total of 2 years or less, 38
per cent of lone mothers on welfare at any point in time will spend over 8
years or more on welfare. These data lead Pavetti to conclude that one
group makes short-term use of welfare and then moves on, another
group makes quite frequent exits and entrances (the ‘cyclers’), while a
third remains more or less settled on welfare for the period studied. 
One of the criticisms made of analysis based on monthly data sweeps is
that the short time frame could overestimate dynamics because of
‘administrative churning’ – that is interruptions in receipt of benefit
caused by the administrative system itself, e.g., when there is a delay in
processing reports of changed circumstances (Pavetti, 1993). However,
Blank and Ruggles (1992) using the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) for 1986 and 1987, which also has monthly sam-
pling points, found that factors such as increased earnings lifting the
claimant above the benefit level rather than ‘administrative churning’
explained the ‘exits’. 
Greenberg (1993) made use of four state based AFDC administrative
sets from Washington, California, Vermont and Minnesota. These data
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tend to suggest a similar pattern to the national data with more than 50
per cent exiting within 12 months.  However where they contain infor-
mation about total time on welfare, this tends to show a smaller propor-
tion of the total group being on welfare for very long periods than is
shown in the national studies. Part of the difference may be the result of
statistical techniques used to deal with uncompleted spells. Both
Greenberg (1993) and Pavetti (1993) draw attention to the effect of
introducing welfare time limits, pointing out that the research on dynam-
ics does not suggest any obvious threshold point beyond which staying on
welfare becomes ‘a way of life’. 
AFDC is a benefit for parents, primarily, though not exclusively, lone
parents. Bane and Ellwood’s (1994) estimate of the main reasons for
ceasing to receive this benefit suggests that nearly a third left because
they married – only 25 per cent left to go into employment. However,
other estimates based on monthly rather than annual data show much
higher exits for work related reasons. Pavetti’s (1993) estimates for
young women in the NLSY sample give a figure of 46 per cent exiting to
work, and just 11 per cent because of changes in family status.  Results
from other studies suggest that reasons for exits from welfare differ
sharply according to the sample, the time period and the age group stud-
ied. The methods used to identify reasons may also be important.1.
Contrary to the ‘New Right’ view of AFDC recipients being ‘career
claimants’, most want to enter the labour market and stay there (Pavetti,
1993). What stops them is inadequate educational attainment and basic
skills, the presence of very young children and where they live (Pavetti,
1993); and critically, as Blank (1997) argues, access to secure employ-
ment paying well enough to lift them permanently clear of the welfare
‘envelope’.
W E L FA R E D Y N A M I C S I N B R I TA I N
Most studies in the US have tended to rely on self-report data obtained
from long-term panel surveys. Until the advent of the British Household
Panel Survey (BHPS) such data has been scarce in the UK. 
Since the first wave of the BHPS in 1991, two types of dynamics study
have emerged. The first, usually referred to as ‘poverty dynamics’ looks at
the movement in and out of low income and is exemplified by a series of
studies emerging from the ESRC Research Centre on Micro-social Change
at Essex (Jarvis and Jenkins, 1995, 1996). These studies do not specifi-
cally look at receipt of benefit but focus on low income in general. Other
studies have used BHPS data specifically to look at the dynamics of benefit
receipt (Ashworth and Walker, 1994). There are problems with panel
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data for this kind of analysis, in particular in respect of response and attri-
tion bias which may disproportionately affect the marginal groups on
low incomes (see e.g., Taylor, 1994 in respect of the BHPS Survey).
Researchers at the Centre for Research in Social Policy (CRSP) at
Loughborough have begun to look at samples of administrative data as a
basis for exploring income support dynamics (Ashworth et al., 1995;
Shaw et al., 1996). Unlike AFDC, income support is available to a wider
range of people than parents. However, the initial findings broadly reflect
the US literature. Among most groups there is a significant degree of
movement but with some claimants being recipients for much longer
periods. For lone parents, they find that those in possession of a driving
licence, those living in an area of low unemployment and those aged over
40 are significantly more likely to leave income support while those with
a child under 5 are less likely to leave.
T H E D Y N A M I C S O F H O U S I N G B E N E F I T A N D C O U N C I L TA X B E N E F I T
C L A I M A N T S
In this article we present preliminary evidence on British ‘welfare dynam-
ics’ using longitudinal administrative data for the entire claimant popula-
tion in a particular district. It is not sample data and is not therefore
prone to sampling error. There are no issues of response or attrition bias,
though there may be problems of claimants leaving the area – an issue to
which we return later. Though the data contains all types of household
we concentrate on lone parents. The data allows us to distinguish female-
headed and male-headed lone parent households. At any time point 94.5
per cent of lone parents are lone mothers. In this article we focus on the
origins and destinations of lone mothers.
The study is based on data from the local authority housing
benefit/council tax benefit (HB/CTB) system of a large town in the north
west of England. We have been extracting HB data from this authority at
intervals since 1988. However, there have been some changes in the data
set in the past which make comparisons over time difficult. Thus from
April 1988 to 31 March 1990 the data represented those in receipt of
housing benefit for rent and/or housing benefit for general rates. In April
1990 the replacement of general rates by the community charge (a local
tax) meant that the data set became a housing benefit/community charge
benefit data set. In April 1993, the community charge was replaced by
council tax. Since the introduction of council tax we have been taking reg-
ular extracts of the data to build up a time series. For administrative rea-
sons the extracts are taken in February and July each year. This means
that we have consistent extracts from July 1993 to July 1996 (seven cuts). 
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The HB/CTB data set is very comprehensive.2 It contains full details of
lone parents who claim means-tested income support and housing bene-
fit – this will include most renters whether in local authority or in other
tenures. It will include those in ‘bed and breakfast’ accommodation or in
hostels. It also includes owner-occupiers as they have an obligation to
pay council tax, and, if on income support, will be entitled to council tax
benefit to cover their obligation. Similarly, it will contain details of lone
parents who, while not entitled to income support, are in low-paid work
or otherwise on a low income and therefore claim either HB or CTB or
both. It will not include lone parents claiming income support who live in
other people’s households – for example, with their parents, though from
a parallel study in another area we have very strong evidence that this
group is very small. There may also be some claimants who have a num-
ber of ‘non-dependants’ living with them whose deemed contribution to
housing costs may extinguish their entitlement to HB/CTB. However,
comparisons with census data again show that such groups are not likely
to be large. 
One of the assumptions about lone parents being part of a ‘dependency
culture’ is that they obtained, by virtue of their status, a ‘fast track’ route
into council housing (under the Housing Act 1985 Part III) (Young,
1993).3 Any lone parents on income support who have obtained accom-
modation in this way will appear on the HB/CTB data, as they will have
become renters.
The data set contains considerable information about claimants. For
example, it holds the date of birth of claimant, any partner, dependent
children and non-dependants. It also contains information on income
sources and amounts for those claimants not on income support. There is
information on tenure, rent payable, HB received and similar information
on council tax liability.
An important feature is that we are able to distinguish lone parents
receiving income support (denoted ‘IS’) from those also present on the
data set with incomes above income support levels but still low enough to
qualify for some housing or council tax benefit (denoted ‘non-IS’ for ‘non-
income-support’ cases). This distinction introduces a further refinement
into the notion of ‘welfare dependency’. The original formulation appears
to have its origins in the US where the term ‘welfare dependency’ is used
to characterise ‘habitual’ receipt of AFDC (Murray, 1984; Jencks, 1992).
In the British context, welfare or benefit dependency could be translated
as dependence on IS – the nearest equivalent to AFDC. However, state
financial assistance and therefore ‘dependence’ can be played out in more
subtle ways in Britain. Lone parents on IS may be receiving a small
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amount of benefit as a ‘top up’ to other income, perhaps from part-time
earnings. Such people will not be ‘dependent’ on IS for most of their
income. Further, there are those not on income support, who still receive
most of their income from the state through other benefits such as inca-
pacity and/or disability benefits. Other lone parents in low-paid work will
be receiving state assistance through Family Credit along with Housing
Benefit/Council Tax Benefit. In our data, 82 per cent of the ‘non-IS’ group
of low-income lone parents are in fact in low-paid work, while the rest are
in receipt of some kind of disability or incapacity benefit.
When commentators and politicians in Britain talk of moving lone par-
ents from ‘welfare’ to ‘work’ as a solution to ‘welfare dependency’, they
are usually equating ‘welfare’ with income support, and treating ‘in work
benefits’ (the combination of Family Credit, HB and CTB) as part of a
machinery to ease the transition into work – even though for many
claimants this clutch of means-tested benefits may still represent the
majority of their income. The administrative data allow us to explore
whether this latter ‘dependent’ group differs from those who leave the
data set altogether.
The technique we use is ‘tracking forwards and backwards’ to test the
stability of the groups on the data sets between two time points. In order
to control for possible seasonal variations, for example in the local labour
market, we have selected two equivalent time points – July 1993 and July
1996. If we consider claimants’ characteristics such as age, numbers of
children and housing tenure, we can begin to construct hypotheses about
the likelihood of their escape from benefit or, alternatively, entry into or
length of time spent on benefit.
Table 1 shows the numbers of lone mothers on the HB/CTB data set at
July 1993 and three years later. The picture that emerges is of an increase
in overall numbers of just under 10 per cent over the three-year period.
However, as noted elsewhere (Noble and Smith, 1996), the apparently
gradual increase obscures the true position. The overall numbers disguise
the turnover of claimants even over this short period. The analysis we
have used hitherto made use of the fact that claims had unique reference
numbers and, at least in the short term, a comparison of claim reference
numbers tells us something about this turnover.4 However, the HB/CTB
data are in fact much more powerful for tracking claimant careers; each
person on the data set is given a unique ‘person number’ whether s/he be
child or adult, claimant or partner. This is held in a ‘dictionary’ and,
according to the local authority, is retained ‘for life’. A person leaving the
data set and re-entering at some time in the future is said to be allocated
the same reference number. Whether this is, in fact, the case remains to
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be seen. What is clear is that it is possible, over relatively short time
scales, to track individuals when their status changes as well as observing
them enter or leave the data set.
We therefore work with a data set which is ‘person’ based rather than
‘claim’ based. This enables us to chart individual claiming careers. This
section of the article reports initial findings from the analysis. We begin
by profiling the lone mothers at each time point. We then look at lone
mother claimants in July 1996 and track them back to July 1993.
Second, we look at lone mother claimants in July 1993 and look at their
whereabouts on the data set in July 1996. In both cases we can examine
the intermediate time points but these are not reported in this article. 
P RO F I L E O F L O N E M O T H E R S ,  J U L Y 1 9 9 3 A N D J U L Y 1 9 9 6
Table 2 shows the age profiles of the lone mothers at each of the time
points. In both years the mean age of the IS claimants is lower than that
of their non-IS counterparts. Moreover only 9 per cent of non-IS lone
mothers were under 25 whereas between 16 and 21 per cent of IS
claimants were under 25. However the number of teenage claimants in
both groups is very small indeed (and declining for IS claimants). 
At both time points IS claimants had 1.9 children on average – slightly
more than the non-IS group (1.7 at both time points). Table 3 shows the
distributions of children:
At both time points a smaller percentage of non-IS lone mothers had
children under 5 than those on IS. Thus in 1996, whereas 38 per cent of
those on IS had at least one child under five only 28 per cent of the non-IS
claimants were in a similar position. This difference is maintained when
we control for age of the mother. 
Because of incomplete data we know little about the economic activity
of the non-IS lone mothers in 1993. However, by 1996 much more com-
prehensive data was available both on hours worked and earnings; 80
per cent of the 1996 non-IS lone mothers were in work. The remainder
was either receiving widows’ benefits or incapacity benefit which took
them above the IS threshold. Those in paid work were earning £93 a
week on average and working 24 hours a week. Of earner lone mothers,
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TABLE 1. Lone mothers on the HB/CTB data set
On income support On HB/CTB only
and HB/CTB (IS) (non-IS) Total
July 1993 2,937 984 3,921
July 1996 3,123 1,159 4,283
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90 per cent were receiving family credit and this amounted, on average,
to £59.60 per week in July 1996.
O R I G I N S A N D D E S T I N AT I O N S
Figure 1 shows the origins of the 1996 lone mothers and the destinations
of the 1993 lone mothers. The figure tells a number of stories.
If we take those on IS in 1993, we find that only 1,433 of the lone 
mothers are still present on the data set as IS claimants – just under 50 per
cent of the original stock. A further 26 per cent have left the data set alto-
gether, 9 per cent have become non-IS lone mothers, while a further 16
per cent remain on the data set, but not in lone parent households. The
‘optimistic’ hypothesis is that 9 per cent have moved into low-paid work
while 26 per cent have moved into higher paid jobs/more prosperous rela-
tionships. It is possible, however, that some of the latter will have left the
study area.
What of the 16 per cent who remain on the data set in another capacity?
Table 4 shows their destinations in 1996, and illustrates the complexity of
their ‘dynamics’. The majority (268 – 57 per cent) continue to claim as
single non-pensioners. Most of these remain on IS – their dependent chil-
dren have simply ‘grown up’ or gone away; 35 five per cent have acquired
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TABLE 2. Age profile of lone mothers on HB/CTB and income support
Mean age of Claimants Number of 
Number claimant under 25 % teenage claimants
IS non-IS IS non-IS IS non-IS IS non-IS
July 1993 2,937 984 31.7 34.4 21.1 8.9 62 2
July 1996 3,123 1,159 32.5 33.8 16.3 9.0 48 7
TABLE 3. Distribution of children in lone mother families July 1993/July 1996 
IS lone mothers non-IS lone mothers
% % 
1993 1996 1993 1996
One child families 46.5 43.4 54.8 51.3
Two children families 32.0 34.0 32.4 35.4
Families with three or more children 21.5 22.6 12.8 13.3
n 2,937 3,123 984 1,159
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partners. Some have then continued to be the ‘claimant’ while others have
become partners (of claimants). In 89 cases (55 per cent of those who
have acquired partners) there is a continued claim for IS as a couple with
children.
As Figure 1 shows, non-IS lone mothers in 1993 have even less stability,
with only 28 per cent remaining in the same capacity 3 years on. Though
there is a small downward shift to IS – 12 per cent, the majority – 50 per
cent, leave the data set altogether, perhaps as a result of obtaining better
jobs/higher wages or perhaps by partnering someone not on HB/CTB.
If we look at the ‘inflow’ picture, we find only 46 per cent of the 1996
IS lone mothers were in the same position 3 years earlier; 29 per cent
were not on the data set at all. Twenty per cent of the inflow, however,
comes from people on the data set in 1993 in other capacities than lone
mothers; 298 (46 per cent) were single claimants, mostly on income sup-
port. A further 254 (39 per cent) were claiming as couples – 78 per cent
of whom were on income support. The rest were either dependent chil-
dren (30) or non-dependants (70) in other people’s households (most
likely to be their family of origin). 
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TABLE 4. Where are they now? Destinations of 1993 IS lone mothers who
remain in receipt of benefit in 1996, but not as lone parents
Income Support?
Status No Yes Total
Claimant Household Single pensioner 25 25
type Couple pensioner 1 2 3
Single non-pensioner 34 234 268
Couple non-pensioner 2 1 3
Couple parent 26 12 38
Total 63 274 337
Partner Household Couple pensioner 4 4
type Couple non-pensioner 1 11 12
Couple parent 26 77 103
Total 27 92 119
Non-dependant Household Single pensioner 2 2
type Single non-pensioner 2 4 6
Couple non-pensioner 2 2
Lone parent 2 1 3
Total 4 9 13
Note: household type classified by benefit category: only ‘parent’ categories contain dependent
children.
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‘ J O I N E R S ’  A N D ‘ L E AV E R S ’
The overall picture is one of significant movement over the 3 year period.
Over this relatively short time period, there is significant turnover even in
the most ‘dependent’ lone mother population – that is, lone mothers on
income support. 
The administrative data allows us to examine these movements on and
off welfare in more detail. Thus we can distinguish two types of joiner and
leaver – ‘internal’ and ‘external’. Claimants who change their benefit 
status but remain within the data set are typically moving into or out of
low-paid work. If a lone mother on IS in 1993 is still on the data set in
1996, but not in receipt of IS, she will typically have left IS eligibility by
moving into work. But she will still be on the data set because her earn-
ings are low enough to enable her to remain eligible for help with her
rent and/or council tax. Some lone parents change their benefit status
and their household status. Often the one may be the result of the other.
Thus a lone parent on IS in 1993 may appear on the data set as a partner
of a claimant of non-IS housing benefit in 1996, as a result of forming a
relationship with someone who is in low-paid work. Those we have
Social Security Claimant Dynamics 361
Not on data
IS
(2,937)
non
IS HB/CTB
(984)
on data
in other
capacity
161
553
494
non IS
HB/CTB (1,159)
on data
in other
capacity (IS+NS)
IS (3,123)
Not on data
Time 7 ( July 1996)Time 1 ( July 1993)
101
469
270
118
1433
765
457
919
271
Figure 1. Lone mother dynamics: July 1993 – July 1996
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termed ‘internal’ leavers or joiners in this article have, however, simply
changed their benefit status. They merit further study for the handle they
may give on the transitions into or out of benefit.
Those lone parents on IS in 1993 who have left the data set entirely by
1996 also repay further study. Provided they have not left the area, they
may represent lone parents who have obtained better paid jobs and who
cannot sustain a claim even to non-IS housing benefit/council tax bene-
fit. Alternatively, they may have entered into relationships where their
new partner is in employment with earnings taking them out of the
housing benefit/council tax benefit envelope. We have termed such
claimants ‘external’ leavers and their counterparts ‘external’ joiners. 
Are external leavers/ joiners likely to have left the area covered by the
housing benefit/council tax data – that is, have they moved from the 
borough? The housing benefit/council tax benefit data comprise house-
holders; migration data for the area in question from the 1991 census
indicates that the migration rate for households with dependent children
is 6.87 per cent per annum. We further know that 77 per cent of annual
household migration for the study area is within borough. The migration
rate out of borough (and thus off the data set) is, therefore, likely to be
around 1.6 per cent per annum. Moreover, although we can only specu-
late, it is possible that, for lone parents on means-tested benefits, the
migration rate out of borough is even smaller. It is, for example, known
that migration rates for council tenants are lower than for other tenures,
and distances moved are less (Coleman and Salt, 1992). For those owner-
occupiers with mortgages, a move out of borough while retaining IS sta-
tus is almost impossible as Building Societies will be reluctant to grant
new mortgages to claimants. Put another way, it is highly likely that the
majority of external ‘leavers’ (and indeed ‘joiners’) are true exits from and
entrants to benefit rather than people simply moving into or out of the
area, without changing their benefit status.
I N T E R N A L J O I N E R S / L E AV E R S
Returning to those who move within the data set at the two time points,
we can offer a detailed profile and begin to construct some hypotheses.
The data show differences between the groups in terms of age and num-
bers of children, and, particularly important, housing tenure.
The mean age of the ‘internal joiners’ is just over 34 years, whereas the
mean age of the ‘internal leavers’ is 33 years. There are marked tenure dif-
ferences between the two groups summarised in Table 5. Owner-occupiers
account for 20 per cent of the ‘leavers’, but for only 8.5 per cent of the
‘joiners’. 
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E X T E R N A L J O I N E R S / L E AV E R S
If we consider the ‘external’ leavers and joiners, we find that the mean
age of both leavers and joiners is around 31 years (leavers 30.2, joiners
30.6). 
Both external leavers and joiners have 1.8 children, with 17.6 per cent
of leavers as compared to 18.5 per cent of joiners having three or more
children. Both groups have around 50 per cent of their children under 5.
The most surprising characteristic of the external joiners is their tenure
pattern. Nearly 42 per cent are private tenants compared with 27 per
cent of external leavers.  This may well be due to the increasing tendency
in the study area (as in many other areas) for the local authority to use
nomination rights over housing association property (which features as
‘private tenancy’ in the data) for new allocations of social housing. 
W H O S TAY S –  W H O G O E S ?
Having described some of the movement patterns, we next examine which
factors in the data best explain these dynamics. We look at the 1993 IS
claimants to identify the factors which appear to promote or restrict move-
ment to non-IS status (i.e., predominantly into low-paid work); and also
the factors which explain escape from the benefit data set entirely (either
into higher paid work or new non-claiming relationships or both).
Using logistic regression we model which lone mothers remain on IS
and which leave. If we look at the lone mothers on the data set as IS
claimants in July 1993, examine their characteristics at that time and look
at their position in July 1996 we can create a series of models which incor-
porate the following factors: the benefit status of lone mothers in July
1996, their age in July 1993, total number of dependent children, having
children under the age of 5, tenure and age when they had their first child.
Information on the claimants’ age and the age of their eldest depen-
dent child was available in our data. Whilst there may be older children
who might have left home, for the younger lone mothers at least, this
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TABLE 5. Tenure of ‘internal leavers’ and ‘internal joiners’
‘Internal joiners’ ‘Internal leavers’
% %
Owner-occupier 8.5 20.4
Private tenant 28.8 20.4
Council tenant 62.7 59.2
Total (n) 100 (118) 100 (270)
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would allow us to derive the age of the mother when the first child was
born. As Figure 2 shows, the average age when they had their first child
is 22.9 years; 31 per cent had their first child below the age of 20; and
only 8.4 per cent below 18; though we cannot, from these data, distin-
guish teenagers who were married when they had their first child from
those who were lone mothers at that time. To test the hypothesis that
‘once’ teenage mothers were less likely to escape IS than those who had
their first child at an older age, we created a binary variable of ‘once
teenage mothers’ (i.e., teenagers when they had their first child) and
examined their chances of leaving IS compared with lone mothers who
were older when they had their first child.
In the following logistic regression analysis, both claimants’ present
age and the number of dependent children are treated as continuous
variables. ‘Once’ teenage mothers and ‘currently having children under
five’ are represented by binary variables. ‘Housing tenure’ consists of
three categories: owner-occupiers, private tenants and council tenants.
The logistic regression findings are presented in two sections: first we look
at the odds of exiting the data entirely as compared to remaining on IS
(that is, external leavers); second, we examine the odds of exiting IS to
non-IS lone mother status as against remaining on IS (that is, internal
leavers). Those lone parents remaining on the data set in some other
capacity, e.g. as partners in couples, were excluded from these analyses.
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Figure 2. Age of parent when having first child
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Table 6 summarises the results for ‘external leavers’. In Model 1 we
control for the number of dependent children and the number of children
under 5. As expected, the number of dependent children has a negative
effect on the chance of leaving income support. Having children under
the age of 5, however, is shown to increase the chance of coming off
income support. The addition of tenure in Model 2 suggests that both pri-
vate tenants and council tenants are less likely to leave IS in 1996 com-
pared with owner-occupiers. In Model 3, we also control for the age of
lone parents in July 1993. Current age again is shown to be a significant
factor; the older the lone parent, the less likely it is that she will come off
income support. 
It should be noted that the effect of having children under 5 was con-
siderably reduced after controlling for claimants’ age. This indicates that
having children under 5 and claimant’s age are highly correlated. In
other words, younger lone parents have younger children, and they are
more likely to have children under the age of 5. That lone parents with
children under 5 are apparently more likely to leave IS may simply be a
reflection of their age, which makes it more likely that they will form new
relationships.
These results can be transformed into ‘odds ratios’. With each year’s
increase in age, the odds of coming off benefit are 0.96:1, indicating a
greater likelihood of older lone parents remaining on income support.
Although the age effect may appear to be small, this accumulates over
the years. For example, the odds of a 10-year increase in age are 0.66:1.
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TABLE 6. Logistic Regression on exiting data (external leavers) in July 96 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant –.69 (.09) –.17 (.15) .95 (.28) 1.17 (.26)
Number of dependent children –.17 (.04) –.17 (.04) –.13 (.04) –.11 (.04)
Having children under 5 .33 (.08) .34 (.09) .06 (.11)
Tenure: 
owner-occupier (base) 1 1 1
private tenant –.39 (.15) –.50 (.15) –.49 (.15)
council tenant –.68 (.13) –.79 (.14) –.78 (.14)
Age –.03 (.01) –.04 (.01)
Teenage mothers –.17 (.11)
Model Chi-Square 29.89 (2) 58.77 (4) 81.24 (5) 80.99 (5)
(degrees of freedom)
N 2,573 2,573 2,573 2,556
Figures in parentheses after the parameter estimates give the standard errors. Significant parameter
estimates are shown in bold.
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For private tenants, the odds of moving off IS are 0.61:1 compared with
owner-occupiers. These odds for council tenants are further reduced to
0.46:1, indicating that owner-occupiers are more than twice as likely to
leave IS as council tenants.
In Model 4 we control for the binary variable ‘once teenage mothers’.
We can assume that any teenage mother who had a child shortly after
she left school would have little or no labour market experience. It could
be argued that ‘once teenage mothers’ have more difficulties in leaving
benefit due to this lack of work experience and perhaps weaker labour
market attachment, as some US studies have suggested (e.g., Bane and
Ellwood, 1994). But the results from this model show that ‘once teenage
mothers’ are not significantly different from their older counterparts in
their chances of leaving income support. In short, there is no evidence
from these data to suggest that ‘once teenage mothers’ are any more likely
to be long-term dependent on IS than mothers who have children later.
In sum, the results suggest that the odds of any lone parent exiting IS
(that is leaving benefit entirely) strongly relate to the current age and
tenure of the individual lone parent, as well as the number of their depen-
dent children. We now turn to the ‘internal leavers’. Here we modelled
the chance of moving from IS to become an non-IS claimant (i.e.,
HB/CTB only case). This group for the most part moves to low-paid work
and is therefore still entitled to help towards rent and council tax. We
anticipated that the number of children would have a negative effect on
the chance of leaving income support, as it could be difficult for lone par-
ents to take up even part-time employment if they have small children,
especially if they are under the age of five. However, unlike the analysis of
‘external leavers’, neither tenure nor having children under 5 was signifi-
cant. Nevertheless, as with external leavers, both claimant’s age and the
number of dependent children were significant in determining the chance
of lone parents moving on to non-income support benefit – the older the
lone parents, and the more children they had, the less likely they were to
become non-IS claimants.
C O N C L U S I O N S :  W E L FA R E DY N A M I C S R E S E A RC H A N D P O L I C Y
In the United States the research focus on welfare dynamics powerfully inter-
acted with the moves for the reform of welfare. As Bane and Ellwood (1994)
note, such research initially underlined the extent of movement on and off
welfare, and thus undercut any simple notion that the majority of claimants
were necessarily permanent welfare dependants. But the evidence that a
substantial number left welfare over even quite short periods provided a
powerful boost to the idea of time limiting. If some can get off, why not all?
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The 1996 welfare reform legislation in the United States, as Bane (1997)
notes,  ‘does indeed “end welfare as we know it”. There is no politically feas-
ible way of going back to the old structure, with its guarantees of assistance
and the federal regulation of state programs.’
Before introducing such radical shifts in welfare policy in Britain, we
need much more information on welfare dynamics, who stays and who
goes, as well as the major reasons.  And we may need to chart a difficult
course between the simple belief in welfare dependency at one extreme,
and at the other, that all can be easily lifted off benefit with the right mix
of incentives and pressures. 
Thus the preliminary data we have presented here show that the
stereotype of the lone parent on IS as a young, perhaps teenage, mother is
not supported – at least for this geographical area. Moreover, even over a
relatively short time period, we find that there is significant turnover in
the lone parent population with movement in and out of IS as well as
movement into other family structures. By looking at lone parents who
migrate from being IS claimants of HB/CTB to non-IS claimants and vice
versa (‘internal’ leavers and joiners) we can derive a profile of the lone
parent who obtains a low-paid job. By examining the ‘external’ leavers
we can describe the lone parent who leaves benefit entirely.
By modelling the benefit statuses of the 1996 lone parents it seems
that, over the time frame examined, younger lone parents and owner-
occupiers will tend to leave the data set while older lone parents 
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TABLE 7. Logistic regression on exiting IS to NS (internal leavers) July 1996 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant –1.32 (.12) –1.13 (.20) –.88 (.24) –.02 (.51)
Number of dependent children –.15 (.06) –.15 (.06) –.14 (.06) –.14 (.06)
Having children under 5 .01 (.12)
Tenure: 
owner-occupier (base) 1
private tenant –.30 (.21)
council tenant –.18 (.19)
Age –.01 (.01)* –.01 (.01)
Teenage mothers –.08 (.14)
Model Chi-Square 7.78 (2) 9.74 (3) 12.24 (2) 11.16 (3)
(degrees of freedom)
N 2,172 2,172 2,172 2,157
Figures in parentheses after the parameter estimates give the standard errors. Significant parameter
estimates are shown in bold.
* It is significant as the parameter estimate is –.014 with a standard error of .007.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 25 Feb 2014 IP address: 131.251.254.13
and council tenants are most likely to stay. The data do not contain 
information to allow investigation into the reasons for this. We can, how-
ever, formulate hypotheses for testing by social survey.
It is possible that younger lone parents are less dislocated from the
labour market and find it easier to obtain work than older lone parents.
Younger lone parents may also be more likely to obtain partners in work
and thus leave the data set altogether. Although migration ‘out of bor-
ough’ is very small for lone parents as a whole, it may be that any such
migration is concentrated among these younger parents.
Some owner-occupier lone parents on IS may be relatively ‘better off ’
and on IS for a short time between separation from their partner and a
financial settlement being reached. They also may represent a more
highly educated and highly skilled group with easier access to the labour
market than renters. To some extent this reflects earlier research. Thus
Ermisch, Jenkins and Wright (1990) used data from the 1980 British
Women and Employment Survey to calculate that for women conceiving
their first child before marriage and marrying young there was a higher
probability of marital breakdown but also a higher probability of remar-
riage; the duration of lone parenthood was comparatively short. For
women marrying later in life, the risk of marital breakdown was lower,
but the duration of lone parenthood longer. However, that study focuses
on ‘entry’ to and ‘exit’ from lone parenthood, in contrast to our focus on
‘entry’ and ‘exit’ in relation to work and benefits. 
However, the parallel reminds us that the obverse of the younger, possi-
bly better-off short stay IS lone parent could be the older less qualified lone
mother living in rented property with limited recent contact with the job
market and possibly a stronger orientation to family and children. It could
be this group which would be most affected by any shifts in entitlement to
benefit, time limiting or moves towards ‘workfare’.
N O T E S
1 Thus, Bane and Ellwood, and Pavetti use a ‘hierarchy’ of reasons that gives precedence to
changes in marital status, if both work and relationship changes are recorded coincident with
exit from welfare.
2 Approximately a quarter of the town’s total population is accounted for by the HB/CTB system,
and almost 100 per cent of some groups such as lone parents.
3 This belief led directly to a curtailment of the homelessness provisions in that part of the 1985
Act (Housing Act 1996).
4 In the long run analysis based on claim reference numbers can be misleading. When a couple
separates but both remain on benefit, one of them is given a new claim reference number.
Moreover, in time claim reference numbers may be reissued.
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